The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NY Convention) is a treaty connected with arbitration, the system of dispute resolution used in international trade. In today's practice, the international commercial arbitration system based on the NY Convention effectively facilitates resolution of multinational commercial disputes and contributes to the world's continuing economic development. The NY Convention is at work only in the courtroom, which means that its terms and provisions have to be construed by local state judges and then applied to the facts of a case. The presence of efficient judiciaries capable of interpreting and applying the NY Convention in a manner compatible with international arbitration norms and standards is an important pillar for the use of arbitration in any state. However, some judicial practices of Arab Gulf States in implementing the NY Convention show undesirable attitudes to the business and arbitration communities in this region. This research article seeks to examine these critical judicial practices to understand whether the undesirable attitudes are related to the courts' commitments to implement the NY Convention, or to the level of familiarity the Arab State judiciaries have with the well-established norms and features of the NY Convention.
‫ﻙ‬ .
Introduction
Arbitration is now the principle method of resolving multinational commercial disputes involving states, individuals, and corporations.
1 This development is one of the consequences of the increased globalisation of world trade and investment. It has resulted in increasingly harmonised arbitration practices by specialised international arbitration practitioners who speak a common procedural language, whether they practice in the East or the West or any other part of the world. The increased reliance on arbitration as a form of dispute resolution to satisfy the needs of commerce may be attributed to the implementation of the NY Convention. This article seeks to examine the possible reasons behind the emerging phenomenon 9 whereby the GCC judiciaries constitute a barrier to REFAA, and to further discuss the possible solutions that would enhance the GCC judiciaries' familiarity with the NY Convention. The article relies mainly on a comparative analysis of the case law on REFAA from the GCC courts with the case law on REFAA from other developed arbitration jurisdictions, with the aim of comparing their judicial practices.
The article first examines how the NY Convention has been implemented in the domestic legal systems of the GCC states, in order to understand the courts' commitment to implementing the provisions of the NY Convention on REFAA. The article then examines the possible adoption of the principle of autonomous interpretation of the NY Convention provisions, and how this principle works in developed arbitration jurisdictions but is missing in some of the GCC judicial practices concerning REFAA.
The 1958 New York Convention
As noted earlier, the increased use of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution in international commercial disputes may be attributed to the considerable work of the United Nations Commission on REFAA does not occur automatically in the state that are parties to the NY Convention. National courts retain the authority to refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards for a limited number of reasons that are set out in Article V of the NY Convention. Article V constitutes the heart and essence of the NY Convention since it seeks to limit the grounds on which arbitral awards may be refused enforcement by the national courts. 15 In broad terms, Article V(1) of the NY Convention provides for five grounds for refusal that have to be proven by the defendant (award debtor), and they are as follows: a) the arbitration agreement is invalid or a party lacks capacity, b) the arbitration proceedings have a lack of due process, c) the arbitral award exceeds the scope of the arbitration agreement, d) the arbitral procedure and composition of the arbitral tribunal was not conducted in accordance with the parties agreement, e) the court of the country of the place of arbitration (seat jurisdiction) annulled the arbitral award. 16 Moreover, Article V(2) of the NY Convention provides two additional grounds for refusal that may be raised by the court on its own motion: a) the subject matter of the dispute cannot be referred to arbitration; b) the arbitral award violates the state's public policy. 17
Key features of the 1958 New York Convention
There are three key features that are well established in the NY Convention literature and that reflect the spirit and purpose of the NY Convention: pro-enforcement bias, narrow interpretation of the grounds for refusal, and exclusive grounds for refusal. These three features are widely accepted by many national courts and commentators on the NY Convention, and they appear in the preparatory work of the NY Convention and many other UNCITRAL works. 18 In their decisions involving the NY Convention, however, the GCC national courts seem to give less weight to these features, as will be discussed in this article.
One of the key features in interpreting any international convention is that it should be interpreted in light of its object and purpose. 19 The purpose of the NY Convention is to facilitate REFAA. 20 It also aims to "unify the standards by which arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries." 21 One of the leading commentators on the NY Convention states, "As far as the grounds for refusal for enforcement of the award as enumerated in Article V are concerned, it means that they have to be construed
This comment suggests that the interpretation to be followed by the courts is that the provisions of the NY Convention, particularly Article V, should be interpreted narrowly, which means that its bars to enforcement should play a role only in limited and circumscribed circumstances. 23 Most of the national courts have, in fact, accepted this feature, particularly in developed arbitration jurisdictions. In addition, the trend in modern arbitration law is to limit the grounds upon which national courts can review arbitral awards to those listed in Article V of the NY Convention. The reason for the adoption of this trend is the desire of the international community to promote the finality of arbitral awards and to activate the principle of party autonomy in choosing arbitration rather than litigation in national courts. In addition, the 16 Id. 
The relationship between international law and domestic law
The relationship between international law and domestic law is a much-debated topic. 25 After the states have fulfilled the formal requirements that make an international convention (a type of treaty) legally binding for the state parties, the question of how the state parties should implement the convention into their legal systems needs to be answered. For example, if a state ratifies the NY Convention, does that fact alone suffice to enable the award creditor to ask the enforcing court (ratifying state) to enforce his/her arbitral award against the award debtor and in accordance with the NY Convention? International law jurisprudence suggests that the answer to this kind of question depends on whether the state subscribes to the theory of monism, on the one hand, or dualism, on the other.
26
The monist theory assumes that international law and domestic law constitute a single system in which international law is applied within a given legal system without the need for it to be transformed into domestic law by legislation. 27 In a monist legal system, international law is part of the internal legal system without the need for internal legislation to give effect to international law. The dualist theory, in contrast, considers that international law and domestic law operate on different planes, international law governing relations between states, and domestic law relations within a state. 28 For example, ratification of a treaty by a state would impose an obligation on it at an international level, but it would have no effect on the state's domestic law unless the legislature enacted domestic law giving effect to the adopted treaty at the domestic level. In a dualist legal system, in summary, international law is independent from national 24 Id.
28
Id.
laws and does not affect rights and obligations at the national level unless domestic legislation is enacted to give effect to the international law in internal legal systems.
29
Throughout the twentieth century, international legal scholarship was divided over whether international law and domestic legal orders constitute a single system (monism) or whether each domestic legal system is self-contained, separate from others and from the international system (dualism). 30 In the present day, these debates seem to have evaporated, primarily because they failed to provide answers to the many questions raised by current practices. 31 This failure is shown by the varying ways the NY Convention has been implemented in the domestic legal systems of state parties. For example, some state parties to the NY Convention that are categorised as monist states have nonetheless enacted a domestic law to achieve the same purpose as the NY Convention (REFAA). Some dualist states have enacted a domestic law that regulates REFAA, while at the same time, the national courts have interpreted the provisions of their domestic law by looking to the corresponding provisions of the NY Convention.
In further contrast, other dualist states, such as the GCC states, do not refer to the NY Convention in their court decisions on REFAA because its recognition and enforcement occur at the domestic level through national laws.
All these different practices suggest different understandings of the concepts of monism and dualism discussed above. The variation also suggests a level of uncertainty surrounding the ideal interpretative approaches to be adopted by national courts in their decisions involving REFAA.
The potential gap in the interpretive approach among the courts' decisions on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
The exact form of implementation adopted in a country is partially predictable. For example, as noted above, some states (monist states) consider an international treaty as self-executing once the state has ratified it, and hence do not require domestic legislation to implement the treaty. Most of these states consider international treaties to have hierarchical authority over national laws: their provisions prevail over the texts of national laws in cases of conflict or in cases where the national law violates the provisions of the international treaty. The best example to explain this scenario is that of France. Although the French constitution 32 considers international conventions as self-executing, France has enacted a larger domestic law (Code of Civil Procedure) that indirectly incorporates provisions similar to those of the NY Convention (without any reference to the NY Convention).
Therefore, in France, the REFAA occurs at the domestic level in addition to the state commitment at international level.
In dualist states, the constitution requires the enactment of domestic law to give the ratified international treaty binding force in the internal legal system. This is, for example, the position adopted by all the GCC states. Some of the GCC states issued a dedicated law called the 'NY In light of this situation, a potential interpretive problem arises during the implementation of the NY Convention provisions at the domestic level. On the one hand, a court is more likely to refer to international rules of interpretation for international treaties if it has to directly interpret the NY Convention provisions. On the other hand, a court is more likely to follow domestic rules of interpretation if it has to interpret the domestic law that regulates the same topic addressed by the NY Convention (REFAA).
In the latter case, the court in question might lose sight of the connections between the NY Convention provisions and the relevant domestic law, in the sense that both of them regulate the REFAA. Although it is not necessarily a problem in all state parties to the NY Convention, this potential interpretation problem appears clearly in some GCC national court decisions on the REFAA.
In fact, most of the GCC judgments on the foreign arbitral awards do not refer to the NY Convention or its internationally accepted features. This approach creates a sphere of uncertainty regarding the applicability of the NY Convention to REFAA in the GCC states. Given that the NY Convention is a treaty that is correlated with the system of dispute resolution in international trade, having a level of certainty about the judicial acceptance of the NY Convention, including its internationally accepted features, is of utmost importance. The question raised is: how can this be achieved?
The following sub-sections will examine cases from developed arbitration jurisdictions that demonstrate a desirable technique of interpretation for court decisions on the REFAA. In these cases, although the NY Convention operates at the domestic level through domestic law, the judges often reconcile the provisions of the domestic law with the corresponding provisions of the NY Convention, bearing in mind its international features and its overall purpose to facilitate the REFAA. This type of interpretation, referred to 
The principle of autonomous interpretation
When domestic law is inspired by an international convention, such as the decrees or arbitration laws that regulate REFAA in the GCC states, autonomous interpretation of the law can be characterised in different ways. An interpretation might be considered "autonomous" if it distances itself from relying only on the meaning provided in the national legal system. 37 This may be referred to as a negative definition. Autonomous interpretation can also be defined in a positive way. In this positive sense, the domestic law that emerges from an international convention and its terms and provisions might be interpreted within the context of the international convention. 38 In other words, the court looks at the texts and purpose of the international convention and does not just rely on the domestic understanding of the texts.
39
It is accepted that every national court tends to interpret the texts of the law according to its own legal tradition, even in the situation where the court is required to interpret and apply a national law that emerged from an international convention. According to German law, an arbitral award only violates public policy under Act V (2) (b) of the New York Convention when it violates a norm that regulates state or economic principles or when it is unacceptably at odds with the German principles of justice. This agrees with the opinion held by a large majority that also from the point of view of public policy, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is subject to a less stringent regime than is the case with domestic arbitral awards, because there is a distinction between national and international public policy.
47
The German court in this case highlighted the norm of distinguishing between domestic and international public policy, but did so with specific reference to the NY Convention. Importantly, the NY Convention does not include explicit reference to international public policy as a ground for refusal, but the court highlighted this feature as it reflects the widely accepted norm in the practice of international commerce.
44
Id. at 4 { 9 (emphasis in bold added). There is an important policy interest, reflected in this country's treaty obligations . . . However, the task of the enforcing court should be as "mechanistic" as possible, save in connection with threshold requirements for enforcement and the exclusive grounds on which enforcement of a New York Convention award may be refused.
49
The NY Convention does not state that the grounds for refusal are exclusive, but it is understandable from the spirit and purpose of the NY Convention. Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia held that "it considered that the pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention, as reflected in the Act, requires that this ground for refusing enforcement not be made available too readily."
50
As demonstrated, autonomous interpretation in this context involves a specific technique used to interpret domestic law that emerges from international conventions or to interpret domestic law that regulates the same topic as does an international treaty ratified by the state. In particular, it seems that autonomous interpretation does not require the traditional methods of interpretation of domestic law to be ignored; rather, it requires a combination of the classical method of interpretation and autonomous interpretation. 51 This combination seems to rely on two layers of interpretation. The first is that achieving a domestic understanding of the texts should not be the predominant aim of the interpretation. The second is that the purpose for having the domestic law, and particularly the convention's purposes, are both inherently relevant to the theme of interpretation.
52
The autonomous approach is particularly relevant to the NY Convention because the interpretation challenge discussed here comes up in most states. The NY Convention regulates REFAA, and most,
if not all, of the NY Convention state parties have enacted domestic law that also regulates REFAA.
The lack of autonomous interpretation in the GCC interpretative approach
Although there is only a limited amount of published case law on the foreign arbitral awards from the GCC states, 53 the GCC judiciaries seem hesitant to use any interpretation approach similar to the approaches described in the foregoing examples from developed arbitration jurisdictions. In the following case law analysis, the arbitral awards were recognised and enforced according to domestic laws that are consistent with the NY Convention. One of the challenges is the fact that courts in all the GCC states do not systematically publish their cases, making it hard to track the progress in terms of the concerns about REFAA. Most of the case law examined in this research was either obtained from the courts' secretariats through a personal visit or was published in a limited number of journals that specialise in arbitration practices in the GCC states. What remains to be done is to keep track of cases and developments in the GCC states, and perhaps for the GCC states to create an online case reporting system for publishing case law materials including the case law on arbitration and REFAA. Similarly, in another case, the Bahrain High Civil Court enforced a foreign arbitral award issued in the UAE without referring to the NY Convention. 59 In a memorandum submitted to the court, the award creditor/claimant sought to recognise and enforce the arbitral award pursuant to the NY Convention and the former Bahraini arbitration law, 60 which was also based on the MLICA. The award debtor/defendant challenged the enforcement request and argued that the arbitral award suffered from a lack of due process, arguing that the arbitral tribunal had not given a proper opportunity for the defendant to present his case. 61 The court dismissed the debtor/defendant challenge and enforced the arbitral award pursuant to Articles 35 -36 of the former arbitration law, which that mirrored articles IV-V of the NY Convention.
Importantly, the Bahraini court did not refer to relevant NY Convention features such as the narrow interpretation of lack of due process claims or pro-enforcement bias; in fact, the court did not refer to the NY Convention at all in the text of the judgment. This kind of interpretation thus reflects a lack of autonomous interpretation, even though the arbitral award was recognised and enforced. Arabia, and recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award was sought through the Bahraini courts. The Bahraini party challenged the enforcement request pursuant to Act Number 6 for 2000, which implemented the GCCAC charter and arbitration rules in Bahrain's legal system and provided for more favourable room for enforcement than the NY Convention. 64 The Bahrain Court of Cassation recognised and enforced the arbitral award and confirmed that if an award is issued by the GCCAC, then superiority is given to the GCCAC implementing law. 65 The text of the judgment did not refer to the NY Convention, particularly Article VII (1), which allows national courts to recognise and enforce an arbitral award according to the more favourable national law.
In another case, the Kuwait Court of Cassation enforced a foreign arbitral award issued in Bahrain without referring to the NY Convention or its features in the text of the judgment. 66 The arbitral award in question was issued in Bahrain by the GCCAC and recognition and enforcement were sought through the Kuwaiti courts. The award debtor challenged the enforcement request on the grounds that the arbitral award was issued under the name of the Bahraini king and thus the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award would violate the state public policy. 67 However, the Kuwait Court of Cassation held that this reason should not be considered as grounds for refusal under Law No. 14 for 2002, which implemented the GCCAC charter and arbitration rules in the Kuwaiti legal system. 68 Ultimately, the Court of Cassation recognised and enforced the arbitral award without referring to the NY Convention, or the feature of exclusive grounds for refusal, or Article VII (1) of the NY Convention.
The foregoing analysis of the judicial practices of some GCC national courts demonstrates why there is increasing uncertainty regarding the acceptance of the NY Convention in the GCC states, including its internationally recognised features such as pro-enforcement bias and narrow interpretation of the grounds for refusal. One could argue that the reason behind the emerging perception that the GCC judiciaries constitute a barrier to REFAA 69 is that REFAA does occur in the GCC states, but through reference to domestic laws rather than the NY convention. This approach does not pose a problem in and of itself.
However, it may raise concern about the applicability of the NY Convention and its internationally accepted features to REFAA.
As explained earlier in this article, in most state parties to the NY Convention, either dualist or monist states, REFAA occurs by reference to both domestic law and the state obligation at the international level to recognise and enforce the foreign arbitral award. Use of a different interpretative approach in a case that involves application of the NY Convention at the domestic level is problematic. Specifically, with 64 regard to the GCC court decisions concerning foreign arbitral awards, it seems that the courts have been losing sight of the connection between the NY Convention provisions and the relevant domestic law, particularly in failing to acknowledge that both of them regulate REFAA.
Therefore, the lack of autonomous interpretation in the GCC courts decisions concerning REFAA makes the NY Convention appear to be merely an international act that the GCC states are willing to be bound by, but that will not impact judicial decisions concerning REFAA. This creates a sphere of uncertainty about whether the GCC states take into consideration the reality that the purpose of the NY Convention is to facilitate REFAA.
This article suggests that it may well be important for the GCC national courts to consider the principle of autonomous interpretation and interpret arbitration law in the context of the NY Convention. The NY Convention is a treaty connected with the predominant system of dispute resolution in international trade, which is arbitration. Highlighting the provisions and features of the NY Convention in the wording of the GCC judgments on REFAA would have a positive impact on perceptions regarding the acceptance of the NY Convention in the GCC states. Otherwise, the ratification of the NY Convention by GCC states might be seen as an act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to the NY Convention, but does not, in fact, change its judicial practices to achieve the convention's purpose.
Conclusion
The NY Convention is a treaty whose goal is to encourage the recognition and enforcement of the most successful system of dispute resolution in international trade: arbitration. Highlighting the provisions and In the GCC cases discussed here, neither the NY Convention nor its internationally accepted features (pro-enforcement bias, narrow interpretation of the grounds for refusal, exclusive grounds for refusal) were referenced in the texts of the judgments. This omission contrasts with cases in most of the developed arbitration jurisdictions where the NY Convention also operates at the domestic level through domestic laws; the judiciaries in these countries have commonly adopted an autonomous interpretation and interpret the domestic law (arbitration law) in the context of the spirit and purpose of the NY Convention. The omission also leaves the question of whether the GCC courts recognize or accept the NY Convention as an essential international treaty in the world of arbitration with an uncertain answer. It also suggests that the GCC states are not consistently helping promote the flow of international arbitration as a means of dispute resolution.
The clash between applying the local law or the NY Convention is not only unacceptable, it also might damage the private sector and weaken the operation of arbitration in the GCC states.
The judiciary of any state plays a significant role in the success of international commercial arbitration practices. It is the gateway for arbitration to enter any country and flourish. Hence, any sort of proposal to enhance the system of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in GCC states must take into account the critical need for GCC judiciaries to be familiar with arbitration practice generally and the NY Convention in particular.
